



**INNOVATING FOR  
THE PUBLIC GOOD**  
**R & D FOR DEMOCRACY**

**Innovation Landscape Analysis**

# Executive Summary

American democracy faces threats from rising authoritarianism, an evolving media landscape and eroding public trust. While the Right has executed long-term strategies to reshape American institutions and culture, the progressive movement has largely responded with tactical improvements rather than true innovation.

This landscape analysis of over 200 organizations shows a concerning lack of focus in the progressive political space on long-term innovative strategies that address culture shifts and restoring public trust.

## Key Findings

### Tactical Improvements

Most innovation in the progressive political movement focuses on tactical improvements to existing electoral strategies rather than on new strategies themselves. Roughly one quarter of the groups included in the landscape analysis purport to do innovative work. They include reference to “innovative policies” or a “culture of innovation,” but almost none of these included innovation in the culture space or on a long-term basis.

### Electoral Focus

Many of the groups that do have a focus on innovation center their work around elections. This includes “labs” or groups that work on technology or testing tactics. This short-term approach, often combined with an emphasis on tactics, cannot adequately address cultural dynamics that contribute to political change.

### Playing Catch Up

Progress that might identify as innovative or trumpet a new strategy is often not. This includes much needed catch up in proven areas like investing in social media influencers or tactical improvements, as mentioned previously, but shows a lack of attention to backing new approaches.

### Innovation Highlights

There have been some promising examples of innovation in the progressive political space in recent years. These include updated approaches to organizing — including distributed and relational — that harnessed unprecedented volunteer energy after the 2016 election and saw a wealth of technological improvements that supported them. An increased focus on constituent-specific strategies also filled critical gaps as voting blocs shifted. Finally, the emergence of new AI technology has shown some promise in improving campaigns, but it is still nascent, and adoption remains limited.

## Gaps and Barriers to Success

Challenges to innovation are plentiful. Investments tend to emphasize presidential elections and avoid risk. Success is often measured by votes or support scores that usually center around a specific candidate or policy. Metrics for success need to be developed that do not center on electoral outcomes but instead emphasize long-term power-building and cultural shifts. The inertia of the political space discourages long-term investments, but patient capital and more nuanced evaluation methods would benefit the progressive political movement as a whole.

## Conclusion

Innovating for the Public Good: R&D for Democracy (IFPG) is uniquely positioned to address the gaps in the progressive political space. The pro-democracy movement must welcome experimentation and the breaking down of silos to move beyond business as usual. IFPG embraces this risk; the risk of not doing so is even greater. The window to course correct is rapidly closing.

What is needed is cultural and structural transformation. There are some good examples of innovation in this analysis, but they need to be applied beyond elections. Investment in pro-democracy innovation requires a new framework for measuring success — one that employs cost-benefit analysis in a more nuanced way with certain bottom-line criteria. Innovation in thinking, strategy and programs is needed. Investing in areas where we need to “catch up” is critical, but it is also imperative that we invest in ideas that move the country and the culture; deliver a public sector that truly serves Americans; and create generational change.

# Introduction

American democratic values face a growing threat. The Right has patiently waged a long-term campaign that has resulted in a conservative Supreme Court, made battlegrounds out of schools and government itself, and elected Trump for a second term.

“Win the culture, win the country.” This quote is from Charlie Kirk, executive director of Turning Point USA, an organization that advocates for conservative politics on high school, college and university campuses. Culture drives change, and culture drives politics. Leonard Leo, a key architect of the Supreme Court’s conservative supermajority, set his sights on influencing all spheres of American life, culture and politics. The Right has been able to move the country and define the culture, in part by positioning Democrats and liberals as outside of mainstream America and at odds with traditional American values.

At the same time, the way people get information and interact with each other is changing. Traditional social institutions now compete with digital communities, group chats or endless algorithm-controlled video feeds. Campaigns have relied on phonebanking for decades, but fewer and fewer people answer their phones. Historically, people got their news from one of a few major networks (TV, newspapers or radio). Now, one’s news can come from a vast majority of outlets that espouse wildly diverging viewpoints.

We must understand the cultural and political paths needed in order to reestablish a functioning and healthy democracy. This requires a strategy outside of the normal election cycles. It cannot be measured purely on votes or in two- or four-year increments. It can be helped by technology, but it will not solely be a technological solution.

**This moment calls for an approach that addresses underlying dynamics threatening U.S. democracy and that develops long-term efforts to shift those trends.**

The urgency of this moment demands unprecedented boldness. IFPG’s research has revealed critical threats to democratic institutions: the rise of authoritarian impulses and the populist Right, media fragmentation, eroding public trust and a progressive ecosystem too risk-averse to drive fundamental changes. At the heart of this lies the need for innovation. In other words, strategies that are transformative and change the status quo. This report will identify where the progressive movement is innovating and where it is not. It will distinguish between investments needed to keep pace with an evolving world versus true innovation in the progressive political ecosystem. We hope to deepen people’s understanding of innovation and inspire the ecosystem to course correct before it is too late.

## What Is Innovation in the Progressive Political Ecosystem?

In the most basic sense, innovation is defined as “a new idea, method or device.” Academics stress that innovation is an [interdisciplinary process that has multiple stages and dimensions](#). IFPG approaches innovation through a strategic lens, ensuring that new ideas address real problems in a novel and meaningful way. Innovation will create structural changes, emerging from the breaking down of silos and the inclusion of non-traditional disciplines such as academia, marketing experts, and elements of arts and culture.

Innovation should occur to fill a need or dramatically improve the efficacy of a proven strategy. That need could have been spurred by the development of new technology, such as AI; created by a change in environment, such as the pandemic; or brought on by a shift in who has power, for example, an emerging voting bloc. Correspondingly, recent innovation in the political space has taken three main forms: tools, organizing strategies and constituent-targeted efforts.

Fixing or iterating on established tools and strategies does not necessarily address shifting needs. It is important to distinguish between strategies and tactics, so one can recognize a tactical improvement versus an innovation. IFPG’s position is that phonebanking and canvassing are tried and true tactics — and that there have been a number of technological innovations that have helped improve those to function at scale, such as NGP VAN and then the Minivan app for tablets and smartphones — but using AI, for example, to improve canvass targeting would mainly be a tactical improvement on an existing, proven strategy, not an innovation.

Those who participated in the November 2023 Innovating for the Public Good: R&D for Democracy Summit identified effectuating culture change as one of the paramount tasks and restoring public trust as another.

This report will describe some good examples of innovation since the 2020 election, but in doing so, it will also paint a picture of an innovation ecosystem that is sorely lacking in the progressive movement.

## Overall Findings

### Self-Identified Innovation

Out of 204 major organizations either working explicitly or implicitly in Democratic or liberal politics, the pro-democracy space or in major university centers, 56 (27%) self-identified as doing innovative work (mentioning innovation on their website or in publicly announced projects). One-quarter of the 56 were think tanks or university centers. Twenty-

four of them (43%) were organizations with an advocacy or electoral focus, and 12 were companies focused on data or technology, but almost all of them worked in service of election campaigns.

In some cases, the self-identified innovation meant that it was part of their mission. For example, the [Analyst Institute](#), which primarily performs research, “aims to maximize civic engagement communities’ impact through research-driven programs and investments, strengthened by a culture of innovation and learning that is open to all.” The [Alliance for Youth Action](#) is doing everything from “mobilizing young voters to passing innovative policy.” It also lists a number of “voting innovations.” Other organizations had a staff person with innovation as part of their title. [Vocal Media](#), which runs targeted digital campaigns often focused on youth, lists a Senior Director of Innovation position.

## Labs/Incubators

Thirteen organizations have a “lab” or have “lab” in their name. Most of these groups describe their lab as some kind of data and technology component, and they do appear to be trying to foster something new, although they may or may not have mentioned innovation explicitly. That often includes running experiments and developing new policies or technology. [Everytown for Gun Safety](#) recently launched [Everytown Labs](#) as a “groundbreaking new initiative to utilize AI technology in the fight against gun violence.” [Movement Labs](#) is “an incubator and consulting firm using technology and experimentation...to build progressive power.” And finally, [NDWA Labs](#) “is the innovation arm of NDWA [National Domestic Workers Alliance] and uses technology to find new ways to make work better for domestic workers.”

[Higher Ground Labs](#) is perhaps the best example of a “lab” whose existence actively encourages new technology developments. Their mission is to “support founders to successfully bring their products to campaigns and causes through our world-class accelerator and beyond. We invest early in political technology companies focused on bettering democracy. We build and strengthen the political tech ecosystem by connecting users and creators of technology.” They doubled down on their mission and launched [Higher Ground Institute](#) in early 2025 to “[be a hub for early innovation, experimentation, and technological adoption that will help propel Democratic groups and the progressive movement forward.](#)” The institute aims to bridge the gap between creation and widespread implementation of advancing technology in campaigns, emphasizing the general risk averseness of election campaigns to adopt new strategies.

## Tactical Innovations Focused on Elections

Whether self-identified or innovative by a strategic definition, self-identified innovations in the progressive political ecosystem weigh heavily towards election campaign tactics. [Movement Labs](#)’ website states this almost explicitly: “We focus on finding new ways to use technology to achieve tangible outcomes in areas like voter registration, candidate

recruitment, and elections.” Higher Ground Institute does acknowledge that we don’t just need new tools, yet it does appear to still primarily be focused around technology ([including “media innovation” and AI](#)) and [cites](#) the low adoption of AI in the 2024 election cycle as an impetus for the new institute.

## Institutions and Academia

A number of academic centers and nonpartisan institutions are studying innovation in relation to government and civics. [Harvard University’s Ash Center for Democratic Governance and Innovation](#) seeks to make government more effective. The [National Civic League’s Center for Democracy Innovation](#) works to “understand, test, and disseminate innovations that can make democracy more participatory, equitable, and productive.” [Yale University’s Institution for Social and Policy Studies](#) and [Tufts University’s Tisch College of Civic Life](#), which focuses on youth engagement, both have programs that support innovation that might “support improvements in representation and government performance” and “initiatives and events that have a clear connection to civic life” respectively. These institutions or university centers are explicitly nonpartisan and often partner with other nonpartisan entities. For example, [CIRCLE](#), the Center for Information and Research on Civic Learning and Engagement, housed at Tisch College, often works in partnership with nonpartisan groups, such as Generation Citizen, to implement strategies for increasing youth civic engagement.

## Innovating for the Public Good

Although these organizations reference innovation or a lab somewhere in their work, many of them are not currently supporting innovation outside of long-standing electoral strategies and tactics. Only five organizations that self-identified as innovative focus primarily in the culture or media space. Most are primarily electoral-based organizations whose work is limited to winning votes. Overall, a small number of organizations (15%) were pushing the way forward with innovative strategies or with a lab or incubator mindset that could potentially produce long-term strategy shifts with the right support or funding. The highlights of innovation in progressive organizing are mentioned in the highlights section below. No other organization has the comprehensiveness that IFPG has. The organization envisions addressing foundational issues by doing deep research, designing pilot programs, testing, iterating and bringing successful ones to scale. However, the work doesn’t stop there. IFPG intends to help organizations adopt new innovations and lower the barriers to adoption.

# Innovation Highlights

## Organizing: Distributed and Relational

There are two approaches to grassroots organizing that have significantly changed the strategy of organizing. The first is distributed organizing, a decentralized model that empowers volunteers. The second is relational organizing, which focuses on organizing one's own network of friends.

For both, the main principles of organizing have not changed. Trying to organize one's own network is not a new strategy. Working to develop volunteer leaders that need less assistance from organizers has always been a goal. But the combination of technology and the scale demanded of these two strategies led to important innovations that cemented their place as organizing requirements, not options.

### Distributed Organizing

Distributed organizing had a strong incubation period during the first Trump Administration, as a flood of people looked for an outlet to channel their energy following the 2016 election. Motivation was high, so organizing these people was more about providing tools to take action versus traditional organizing tactics of phonebanking for volunteers, recruitment meetings, etc. Groups like [Indivisible](#) built off a model that Senator Bernie Sanders' presidential primary campaign had notably utilized and went from tweeting out a basic Google Doc with a "how to" resist Trump to having thousands of chapters all over the country guided by occasional check-ins and a Slack channel. Although it eventually caught up with hiring paid staff to support these volunteers, it started as a way to fill a gap: how to provide a resource to a newly hungry activist base, even if it didn't realize how big that base would be.

Distributed organizing reached another peak during the 2020 election cycle. Primary campaigns like [Elizabeth Warren's](#) made distributed a main organizing strategy. The evolution of digital tools like Slack and Zoom helped its progress, but distributed organizing is not simply "online organizing." The true recent innovations of distributed organizing are the ability to empower volunteers at scale, without an organizer. So, when the pandemic eliminated most in-person organizing, distributed organizing had already laid the foundation for volunteer models that were less dependent on on-the-ground organizers. Distributed organizing provides the conditions for ground-up organizing, rather than top-down. In order to meet the needs required to execute this strategy, technology was essential. With easily available tools like phonebanking and [Mobilize](#) links, it is easy for volunteers to organize their own events with their own networks, while headquarters can still monitor results. Distributed organizing has created a well-trained citizenry in phonebanking, so that in 2024 distributed organizing had a cemented place in the main pro-

Democratic campaigns. The [Sunrise Movement](#) made over 4.2 million voter contacts primarily through their distributed organizing model in the 2024 cycle.

## Relational Organizing

Relational organizing was perhaps a reversion to old-school organizing methods. It also sought to address lagging contact rates through traditional voter contact outreach. Rather than relying on voter files, relational organizing turns one's own contact list into organizing targets. Technology, funding and focus have helped to organize this to be more scalable as well as match relational contacts to voter file information. It also draws from the mantra that trusted messengers are the best vehicles to persuade or provide information.

Organizations like [Empower](#) had led early efforts to combine technology with relational organizing, but it took until 2022 for them to execute a [large, state-wide relational organizing program](#). Their app was one of the first that allowed people to record contacts and results within their phones, making relational organizing more accessible than phonebanking, which often requires a computer. In 2020 and again in 2024, relational organizing had dedicated programs (and apps!) that have helped to propel this into a strategy that continues to iterate and optimize.

Another prominent relational organizing tactic is vote tripling, pioneered by Vote Rev in the 2020 election. Vote tripling asks a voter to contact three of their friends and ask them to vote too. [Vote Rev](#) worked to enable this tactic at scale and has evolved to become an organization striving to make more innovations in voter turnout by focusing on [behavioral science](#).

## Community-Specific Tools and Strategies

Organizations, tools and strategies targeting constituency groups, mainly Latino and African American voters, have proliferated in recent years. This is not to minimize the important contributions of long-standing organizations such as the [NAACP](#) and [Unidos](#). But with the growth of these populations (as voters), eventually came additional targeted efforts. Social media accounts, such as [Push Black](#), [Pulso](#) and others incubated by [Accelerate Change](#), have filled in gaps to combine media with civic engagement and advocacy for specific audiences that more mainstream digital accounts don't speak to directly.

Other targeted efforts have utilized WhatsApp to organize people where they are. [National Domestic Workers Alliance](#), [NextGen](#) and [Mi Familia Vota](#) have all used WhatsApp in either English or Spanish to reach their constituents in the medium they use to communicate normally. These efforts filled a gap where traditional organizing and media were not sufficiently reaching people. Additionally, translation, interpretation services or hiring people to speak in-language are becoming increasingly common, although not yet ubiquitous.

## Tools: AI, Apps and More

Artificial intelligence (AI) has entered the organizing chat. AI is being deployed in a number of campaign tactics, from AI-assisted development, testing and targeting for ads to copywriting and chatbots that can discuss a candidate's issues or give instructions on how to vote. While the application of AI to campaigns is still in its growth stage, it was used by a number of organizations in 2024. [Battleground AI](#) helped campaigns test and refine digital ad content. [La Alianza](#), [NextGen](#) and [Mi Familia Vota](#) all used an AI-powered chatbot to reach voters.

However, 2024 was not the "AI" election some [predicted](#), as observed by Higher Ground Labs in the lack of adoption of AI tools. In some cases, this was a good thing. After a notable attempt to use AI to copy President Joe Biden's voice for robocalls in New Hampshire, there was *not* a proliferation of deepfakes using generative AI. Still, post-election analysis reported by the [Washington Post](#) showed that AI was most impactful at entrenching people's political beliefs, rather than changing their minds about any particular candidate or action. And it only added to the cacophony of misinformation already running rampant on the internet.

# Post-2024 and Beyond

## New Trends: Playing Catch Up

Post-2024 election innovations are still in formation, but the early trend has weighed heavily towards efforts to prop up influencer networks. [Chorus Media](#), [AND Media](#) and [others](#) want to beat the Right online. It is vital for the pro-democracy voices to take up more space online and not cede the medium. But while there are new investments, they are not particularly innovative. So far, they seek to catch up to a strategy that has already been proven to work by the opposition, rather than create a new one. Other post-2024 talk includes making investments to [upgrade NGP VAN or build a new voter database](#) altogether. This is certainly a critical and fundamental need, but it is also an example of making a catch-up investment, rather than an innovative one. We need to take a both/and approach. Catch up, but invest in leaping ahead. Pay attention to electoral politics, but do not limit the focus to that.

Undoubtedly, we have yet to see all the new organizations that will be developed in the second Trump Administration. The first year of the first Trump Administration saw the founding of no fewer than 17 consequential organizations, including [Run for Something](#), [Swing Left](#), [The Hub Project](#) and the already mentioned [Higher Ground Labs](#) and [Sunrise Movement](#). Of the 204 organizations included in the research for this report, 58 of them were started in the *5 years* between 2016-2020, compared to a similar number, 59, that were formed in the preceding *11 years* between 2004-2015.

## Applying New Technology to Existing Campaign Tactics

While 2024 saw some use cases for AI in campaigning (referenced in the previous section), the application of AI to campaign tactics still has a lot of room to grow. Many ideas appear to be ways to improve upon existing tactics — or to make them considerably cheaper or more efficient. For example, [AI polling tools](#) could use AI’s growing knowledge of human behavior to enhance live polling subjects. Alternatively, synthetic panels could be created using AI to both create the panels and survey them. (Synthetic panels can generate information and answers using AI instead of real-life voters.)

Notetaking or transcripts from meetings to phone conversations can improve efficiency and even help [better train live callers](#). While some of these tactics can replace human volunteers or paid staff, audiences have appeared to [reject AI-generated phone calls](#) so far, so there are some limits to its use. One potential upside to AI use in politics could be to curb the amount of money and human hours it takes to run a campaign.

## Challenges to Innovation

While it’s clear that new strategies need to be adopted in the face of rising authoritarianism and a Republican trifecta, there are challenges to innovation in the progressive political ecosystem. Electoral campaigns are an inherently risk-averse space. They are short-term, time-bound efforts where managers often loath to take risks — no matter the potential benefits — if the outcomes feel unproven. Most choose proven tactics that have a longer track record of success to give the safest odds for winning. This is often the same for investors who want to see an immediate “return” on their investments. Grants or donations tend to be in electoral or legislative cycles. And groups are often hesitant to become budget dependent on any one large donor in case that funding disappears in a year or two. Pennsylvania alone had [\\$1.2 billion in ad spending](#) in the 2024 cycle.

The boom-and-bust staffing levels that are afforded by electoral campaigns are another unhelpful aspect when it comes to innovation. The time frame between elections is relatively short — two years from Congressional to Congressional and another two years from Congressional to Presidential. This does not even count the myriad of local races that may happen in so-called off years. It wouldn’t take much to bridge the gap between these cycles and have staff maintain a year-round presence, and while the significance of “bridge funding” in a campaign context is becoming more understood, the practice of doing it is not the norm. This concept applies to other, non-staffing tactics.

The effort to address the threats we face as a country as it moves to a competitive authoritarian regime cannot be underestimated. These threats, and others, will not be defeated with a narrow campaign and electoral approach. A winning concept and its implementation are more in harmony with the kind of long-term work that is necessary to shift the culture away from threats to U.S. democracy. As opposed to electoral-based campaigning, movement builders tend to embrace values-based ideologies over specific

candidates, which lends itself more toward culture shift. While they may appear to do similar work, the ecosystem of organizations that do work — including legislative advocacy, social justice work, community organizing and other non-electoral work — is a separate world from the Democratic Party and its campaign apparatus, which primarily exist to win elections for Democratic candidates. The silos between these two groups, as well as among artists, academics, technologists and others, must be broken, and collaboration must be encouraged, if not required. They must embrace innovation and not default to what they know.

## Conclusion

While pro-democracy forces — candidates and organizations — are constantly iterating, new developments in the last five years have largely focused on better ways to perform the same tactics in an attempt to win elections. Notable efforts harnessed the power of a fired-up army of volunteers post the 2016 election at a scale not seen in recent history, largely through the power of the internet and new tech tools. But the strategies used in these newer developments were mostly tried and true. Birddogging elected officials at town halls, calling or texting your friends and family to remind them to vote, or using technology to reach people more efficiently with better records, messaging or targeting were important advances on existing tactics. In particular, technology investments are happening, but often in support of existing strategies.

Investment in pro-democracy innovation requires a new framework for measuring success — one that employs cost-benefit analysis in a more nuanced way with certain bottom-line criteria. But we need to develop new measurements that are more appropriate to the strategy.

Randomized control trials that test various versions of the same message to see which one turns a higher percentage out to vote can be useful but may be too narrow to capture the long-term impacts of power-building exercises and programs, cultural shifts and structural change. Some of the most critical investments — civic engagement infrastructure, narrative change and democracy-building efforts — require patient capital and a willingness to take risks. These efforts should be able to demonstrate their value, but these efforts cannot always be measured through simple arithmetic or their impact on a certain election cycle.

Those who do not think American democracy serves their interests have run a sustained 70-plus-year effort. Those on the Right have demonstrated the power of sustained investment in reshaping American institutions, investing in media, organizing in and around social structures like schools and churches, dominating state and local politics, and creating an operating climate that leads to successes in electoral politics. They have built enormous power to make sure the instruments of the public sector bend to their will and

that there is a shift in ideology — one that is antithetical to the founding tenets of America's zeitgeist.

Innovation in thinking, strategy and programs is needed. Investing in areas where we need to “catch up” is critical. It is also imperative that we invest in ideas that move the country and the culture, that deliver a public sector that truly serves Americans, and that creates generational change.

The Constitution is a work of genius, and it understood that as time passes, things change. Its ambiguities are its strength in terms of advancing rights, opening opportunities and protecting Americans. However, its ambiguities have also been used in a way that led to tragic consequences. The Trump Administration has taken advantage of a compliant court to use the Constitution against our democracy.

It is time we say no. It is time to build a revitalized democracy that advances and meets the needs of all those who live here now and creates a new future for all of us and the generations to come.

# Appendix

## I. List of Organizations in Innovation Landscape Analysis

AAPI Victory Alliance  
AAPI Victory Fund  
Accelerate Change  
Accountable.us  
ACLU  
Act Blue  
Action Network  
All Voting Is Local  
Alliance for Youth Action  
America Votes  
American Bridge  
American Promise  
Analyst Institute  
AND Media  
APIA Vote  
Ash Center for Democratic Governance and Innovation  
Asian American Power Network  
Asian Americans Advancing Justice (AAAJ)  
Ballot Initiative Strategy Center  
Battleground AI  
Bend the Arc  
Bipartisan Policy Center (BPC)  
Black Lives Matter  
Bloomberg Center for Public Innovation  
Braver Angels  
Brennan Center for Justice  
Brookings Institution  
Campaign Legal Center  
Care In Action  
Carl Levin Center for Oversight and Democracy  
Catalist  
Center for American Progress (CAP)  
Center for an Informed Public  
Center for Community Change  
Center for Cultural Power  
Center for Democracy and Technology (CDT)  
Center for Inclusive Democracy  
Center for New Democratic Processes  
Center for Popular Democracy  
Center for Social Media and Politics  
Center for Tech and Civic Life (CTCL)  
Center on Budget and Policy Priorities  
Center on Democracy, Development, the Rule of Law  
Center on Global Democracy  
Channel Zero  
Chorus AI  
Chorus Media  
Cinereach  
Citizen University  
Civic Nation  
Civis Analytics  
Climate Action Network  
Climate Power  
Code for America  
Color of Change  
Common Cause  
Courier Newsroom  
DAGA  
DASS  
Data for Progress  
Dayenu  
Demand Justice  
Democracy 2076  
Democracy Forward  
Democracy Lab  
Democracy Works (TurboVote)  
Democratic Congressional Campaign Committee (DCCC)  
Democratic Data Exchange  
Democratic National Committee (DNC)  
Democratic Senatorial Campaign Committee (DSCC)  
Democratic Socialists of America  
Demos  
DGA  
DLCC  
Double Tap Democracy  
Economic Policy Institute (EPI)  
Economic Security Project

Emerge  
Emgage  
EMILY'S List  
Empower Project  
End Citizens United  
Equality Federation  
Equis  
Everybody Votes Campaign  
Everytown for Gun Safety  
Fair Fight (Action)  
Fair Vote  
Faith in Action  
Faith in Public Life  
For Our Future  
Forward Majority  
Freedom House  
Future Caucus  
Giffords  
GovAct (Governors Action) Alliance  
Groundwork Collaborative  
Grow Progress  
Harkin Institute for Public Policy and Citizen  
Engagement  
Harmony Labs  
Healthy Democracy  
Higher Ground Labs  
Higher Heights  
Hip Politics  
Hispanic Federation  
Hub Project  
Human Rights Campaign  
Impact  
Impactive  
Impactual LLC  
Indivisible  
Institute for Democratic Engagement and  
Accountability (IDEA)  
Interfaith Power and Light  
Issue One  
Jewish Voice for Peace  
Justice Democrats  
La Alianza  
Latino Victory Fund  
Lawyers Committee for Civil Rights Under  
Law  
Leadership Conference on Civil and Human  
Rights  
League of Conservation Voters

League of Women Voters  
Localyst Media  
March for Our Lives  
Mi Familia Vota  
Mijente  
MIT Election Data and Science Lab  
Moms Clean Air Force  
Moms Demand Action  
Movement Cooperative  
Movement Labs  
MoveOn  
NAACP  
National Association of Nonpartisan  
Reformers  
National Civic League - Center for Democracy  
Innovation  
National Conference on Citizenship  
National Democratic Institute (NDI)  
National Democratic Training Committee  
National Domestic Workers Alliance  
National Institute for Civil Discourse (NICD)  
Natural Resources Defense Council  
National Women's Law Center  
New America  
Next Gen America  
Noticias Para Immigrantes  
Open Secrets (Center for Responsive Politics)  
OSET Institute  
Our Revolution  
Parents Together  
Participatory Budgeting Project  
People for the American Way  
People's Action  
Planned Parenthood Action Fund  
Poder Latinx  
Priorities USA  
Progressive Policy Institute  
Project Bullhorn  
Protect Democracy  
Public Citizen  
Pulso  
Push Black  
Race Forward  
Rad Comms Network  
Represent US  
Reproductive Freedom for All (NARAL)  
Rock the Vote  
Roosevelt Institute

Rose Institute of State and Local Government	Third Way
Run for Something	Tisch College of Civic Life
Rural Democracy Initiative	Trust for Civic Life
Scale to Win	Unidos
Shorenstein Center	United We Dream
Sierra Club	USC Dornsife Center for Political Future
SNF Agora Institute	UVA Center for Politics
Standing Up for Racial Justice (SURJ)	Verified Voting
Stanford Center on Philanthropy and Civil Society	Vocal
State Innovation Exchange (SIX)	Vote Forward
State Voices	Vote Rev
States Project	Vote.org
States United Democracy Center	Voter Participation Center
Sunrise Movement	Voters of Tomorrow
Supermajority	Voting Rights Lab
Swing Left	Voto Latino
The Fairness Project	Working Families Party
The Public Interest Network	Yale Institution for Social and Policy Studies
	Zinc Collective

## II. Methodology

The main focus of the landscape analysis is a 200+ sample size of well-known national organizations in the progressive political space, whether expressly partisan or not. It prioritizes non-profit organizations over for-profit firms or groups that fund others, and it covers a wide range of constituencies. The list of organizations also includes civic centers or similarly focused entities at academic institutions and the main groups that constitute the Democratic Party infrastructure, such as the Democratic Congressional Campaign Committee. It includes several of the post-2024 election newly announced organizations that have been cited in the media.

This research was conducted using publicly available information via the internet. The vast majority of information, such as mission statements and leadership, come directly from the organizations' websites when available or from other public documents such as 990s. Websites were searched for mentions of innovation through the websites themselves and with the assistance of AI.

IFPG is eager to hear of additional innovation efforts and looks forward to adding to this analysis.